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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE:
EXTENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE TO ACTS IN CRIMINAL CASES
Policy and History of the Privilege
The privilege for confidential communications
between husband and wife provides that neither
spouse can be examined during a trial as to any
private communication made by one to the
other during the marriage.' The privilege may
be invoked only at the instance of the spouse
in whose favor it lies and it may be waived only
by him. An important limitation on the privi-
lege, however, lies in the general rule that while
the fact and substance of a communication may
be privileged, testimony by the other spouse as
to what he did in reliance thereon is not privi-
1 The privilege was recognized by the English
common law as early as 1684 in Lady Ivy's Trial,
10 How. St. Tr. 555, 628 [cited in 8 WiGmonE,
EviDENCE § 2333 (3d. ed. 1940)] although an ex-
plicit statement of the rule was not made in that
country until the second half of the Nineteenth
Century.
A distinction must be drawn between two parallel
but essentially different rules relating to the marital
relation. The marital disqualification rendered one
spouse incompetent to testify, as an interested
party, at the trial of the other. The privilege itself,
on the other hand, when invoked by the party in
whose favor it exists, renders the testifying spouse
incompetent only as to the privileged matter, i.e.,
confidential communications made during the mar-
riage, even though the spouses are divorced or
separated at the time of trial. The marital dis-
qualification has for the most part been abolished,
its legislative abrogation being frequently contained
in the statutory statement of the privilege itself.
See note 8 infra.
leged. 2 Although it has been strongly advocated
that this privilege be limited in scope,3 the
privilege normally extends not only to verbal
statements but to acts as well.
The policies upon which the privilege is based
lie in several fundamental socio-legal consider-
ations: (1) the communication must originate in
confidence; (2) the confidence is necessary to the
preservation of the relationship involved; (3)
the relationship is a proper subject of encourage-
ment by the law; (4) the injury that would inure
to the relationship by the disclosure is probably
greater than the benefit that would result from
the judicial investigation of the truth.4 Where
the marital relationship has been established,
the last three of the foregoing considerations
have been satisfied.5 The variable, however, is
2 Sampson v. Sampson, 233 Mass. 451, 112 N.E.
84 (1916). Although this is an indirect method of
proving the substance of the confidential communi-
cation, it seems logical to allow the trier of fact to
draw all reasonatile inferences as to the substance
of the communication from what was said or done
afterward.
3 Dean Wigmore argued against the inclusion of
acts under the privilege except under special cir-
cumstances. 8 WIGo.E, EvmEicE § 2337 (3d. ed.
1940). Professor McCormick points out that the
privilege is frequently invoked to protect acts in
furtherance of a crime or fraud, which should not
be protected. McCoMncK, EvmENcE § 83, at 171,
172 (1st ed. 1954).
4 VIGMOa, EvIDENCE at 637 (3d ed. 1940).
5 The fourth consideration is subject to the limita-
tion which excludes acts of abuse committed by one
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the requirement that the act must originate in
confdence because only confidential communi-
cations are privileged.
A connmmunication signifies any act of a spouse
which is seen or perceived by the other spouse.
This broad definition of a communication is
similar to that adopted by the Restatement of
Torts6 and is consistent with other contempo-
rary authorities, including the Uniform Rules of
Evidence and The Model Code of Evidence.
7
An act denotes any overt physical manifestation
other than verbal utterances. Whether or not a
givefn act comes within the privilege depends
upon the application of certain criteria which
may be formulated from the cases and statutes.
As the privilege is governed by statutes in most
jurisdictions, the language of the applicable
statute9 or the common law rule in force (as the
spouse against the other from the protection of the
privilege. See text at notes 28 and 29 infra.
t "The word 'communication' is used to denote
the fact that one person has brought an idea to the
perception of another.. .". 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 559, comment (a) (1938).
The Uniform Rules of Evidence include as a
"statement" in addition to oral and written expres-
sion, non-verbal conduct by a person intended
by him as a substitute in expressing the matter
stated. UNiFORm RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 62
(1) (1953). Presumably this broad definition would
include acts, as well. Likewise, the Model Code of
Evidence includes as a "statement," both conduct
intended by the person making the assertion to be
such, as well as conduct of which evidence is offered
for a purpose requiring an assumption that it was
so intended. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 501
(1) (1942). The Code recognizes that one may use
conduct other than words as a means of making an
assertion. Thus, whatever one's intent, one's con-
duct may be interpreted by others as if intended to
be an assertion. Id. at page 225.
BE.g., TENN. CODE Ar. § 9777 (1932): "...
husband and wife shall be competent witnesses,
though neither husband nor wife shall testify to
any matter that occurred between them by virtue
of or in consequence of the marital relation." All of
the statutes are collected in 2 WIGMloE, op. Cit.
supra § 488.
9 The various criminal and civil statutes differ as
to the term employed to describe a "communica-
tion." E.g., CAL. CODE Civ. PRoC. ANN. § 1881 (1)
(1955): "any communication;" ILL. REv. STAT. c.
case may be)'0 should serve as a preliminary
focal point. However, it is necessary to bear in
mind that such statutes or general common law
rules are not of themselves definitive, but are
subject to the implications and limitations read
into them on the basis of other factors.
In conferring the privilege upon acts, many
courts have regarded the presence or absence of
a communicative intent on the part of the actor
as one of the controlling factors. It is to be noted
that the phrase communicative intent is sus-
ceptible of two different interpretations. The.
first meaning is indicated by the natural pur-
port of the words; it refers to a specific intent on
the part of the actor that the communication
shall be received by the other spouse. The
second meaning, which is much broader, exists
wherever the actor intends to do a given act
which may be perceived by the other spouse. It
is frequently difficult to determine in which
sense a court is using the term. For purposes of
analysis, the cases which the courts encounter
in applying the privilege can be divided into
three types: (1) where communicative intent on
51 § 5 (1953): "admission or conversation;" IND.
STAT. ANN. § 2-1714 (550) (1946): "Sixth-com-
munications made to each other;" Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 421.210 (C.C.606) (9153): "any communication
between them during marriage;" MASS. GEN.
LAWS c. 175, § 20 (1955); "private conversations;"
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.020 (1952): "admission or
confidential communications;" N.H. REv. LAWS c.
392, § 29 (1942): "statement, conversation, letter,
or other communication;" N.Y. PENAL CODE c.
676, § 715 (1881): "confidential communications;"
Omo CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (1955): "communica-
tion or act;" TEXAS CODE CRIM. PRoC. Art. 714
(1925): "communication... while married;" TMz .
CODE ANN. § 9777 (1932): "matter;" UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-24-8 (1953): "any communication made
... during marriage;" VA. CODE § 8-289 (1950):
"communication privately made;" VT. REv. STAT.
§ 1738 (1947): "statement, conversation, letter...
communication... (or) matter;" WASH. REV.
CODE § 5.60.060 (1955): "communication made...
during the marriage." See 2 WIossoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 488 (3d. ed 1940).
10 In some states, it is provided by statute that
the common law rules of evidence shall apply in
criminal prosecutions, e.g., Illinois. See note 29
infra.
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the part of the actor can readily be found; (2)
where the intent is not readily discernable; and
(3) where there exists, either inferentially or
actually, an intent not to communicate.
The Presence of a Communicative Intent
The first type of case, in its simplest form,
consists of a communication much like a verbal
act. For example, a wife asks her spouse whether
he has procured travel tickets, to which he does
not answer verbally, but produces the tickets
themselves. Here the communicative act re-
places and is tantamount to a verbal answer.
Such an act would be privileged, as a clear
intention to assert an idea is manifest from the
nature of the act itself.
Cases where the Communicative Intent Is
Not Present
In the second type of case, the courts have
not hesitated to apply the privilege by inferring
an intent. These cases squarely present the
problem of whether an inent to communicate
must necessarily exist where the act is done in
the presence of the other spouse. An adoption of
the broad definition of communicative intent
assumes the answer to be in the affirmative.
While this result is not necessarily to be criti-
cized, this is a question-begging manner of
analysis. On the other hand, the position has
been taken that an observation by the wife is
not necessarily synonomous with an assertion
by the husband. n The reasoning from this more
narrow definition of communicative intent would
result in greatly restricting the use of the privi-
lege. Such an approach is open to two strong
objections: first, it is more likely than not that
an act done in the other spouse's presence will
be observed; and second, that a broader view
would dictate that the major consideration
should relate to the act being done in reliance
upon the marital confidence, rather than
whether or not an intent existed on the actor's
part. While the following cases illustrate that
intent is regarded as a material factor in the
decisions, the conclusion is inescapable that this
criterion is at best a vague and perplexing one.
" See Note, 35 VA. L. Rav. 1111, 1112 (1949).
See also Note, 3 VAm. L. REV. 656-659 (1949-50).
Decisions using it in conferring the privilege
must, more often than not, be supported on
broader theories, because cwnmunicative intent,
in its narrow sense, is rarely found to exist.
In one case12 the accused returned home late
on'the night of a burglary bringing nothing with
him. This was observed by his wife who later
saw him with money, helped him to count it,
and subsequently saw him purchase merchan-
dise therewith. These acts were privileged under
the broad theory.u In a similar caseY4 the
accused's wife observed him coming home late
on the night of a burglary in an unusually
nervous condition. He placed a pistol on the
mantel, later scraped paint from his car, and
eventually had his wife drive him through the
neighborhood where the safe was later found.
The Court held that the wife's observations of
these acts were privileged.15 In another case
where a piece of material found at the scene of
the crime matched that of an overcoat owned
by the accused, the privilege was held to exclude
from evidence the wife's observation that the
accused had left that morning wearing the
2 Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425, 56 Am. Rep. 40
(1885).
2 The acts of counting the money and (pre-
sumably) of purchasing merchandise would also be
privileged under the narrow meaning of communica-
tive intent. There was apparently a specific intent
on the part of the husband that his wife should re-
ceive the communication, she having taken part
in the acts in question.
14 Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 55
S.E.2d 9 (1949), applying CoDE oP VA. § 6212
(1942) (now VA. CODE § 8-289, 1950): "Neither
husband nor wife shall, without the consent of the
other, be examined in any case as to any com-
munication privately made by one to the other while
married, nor shall either be permitted, without such
consent, to reveal in testimony after the marriage
relation ceases any such communication made
while the marriage subsisted."
15 The act of having his wife drive him through
the neighborhood where the stolen safe was hidden
would be privileged under the narrow interpretation
of communicative intent for the reasons set forth
in note 13 supra. See also Delk v. Commonwealth,
285 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1955), 286 S.W.2d 531 (Ky.
1956).
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overcoat in question and had returned home
unusually late wearing another coat. 6
While the courts held these acts privileged by
reasoning that they invited the wife's attention
(i.e., an intent to communicate) the holdings
rest as well on the broader premise that the
policy of the privilege dictates protection of all
knowledge gained by virtue of the marital rela-
tionship, subject to certain qualifications. This
theory was broadly applied in the recent case of
People v. Daghita,'7 where the Court reasoned
that the accused would not have brought home
stolen merchandise (making no apparent effort
to conceal it from his wife) except in reliance
upon the assumption of confidence then existing
between the spouses. Implicit in the ruling is an
assumption that the accused intended that the
communication would be perceived as well as
held inviolate by his spouse.'
16 People v. Woltering, 275 N.Y. 51, 61, 9
N.E.2d 774, 778 (1937) applying N.Y. PENAL
CODE c. 676, § 715 (1881): "The spouse of a de-
fendant in a criminal case is a competent witness ...
but neither ... can be compelled to disclose a con-
fidential communication, made by one to the other
during their marriage." Because the accused was
the witness' common law husband, an issue existed
as to whether the privilege was applicable at all.
The Court also held as privileged the wife's testi-
mony that (1) she had been home during the day
and the accused had not returned home to change
coats, and (2) that he had asked her, upon his re-
turn home, to tell anyone who might inquire that he
had returned home at an earlier hour. 275 N.Y. at
57, 9 N.E.2d at 776.
17 299 N.Y. 194, 86 N.E.2d 172 (1949) applying
the New York statute, supra note 16.
18 "The term communication means more than
mere oral communications of conversations between
husband and wife. It includes know]edge derived
from the observance of disclosive acts done in the
presence or view of one spouse by the other because
of the confidence existing between them by reason
of the marital relation and which would not have
been performed except for the confidence so exist-
ing." 299 N.Y. at 199, 86 N.E.2d at 174. Accord,
People v. Gessinger, 238 Mich. 625, 214 N.W. 184
(1927) applying the Michigan statute. Mica.
STAT. ANN. § 27.916. The Court extended the
privilege to cover a wife's observation of stolen
property in the house, even though she had not
seen her husband bring it home.
As a limitation upon the broad Daghila
theory the privilege is not applied to acts ob-
served by a spouse which are also done within
the easy observance of third persons. The
theory of the limitation, which applies in all
areas of the privilege, is that such act is not done
in reliance upon the marital confidence and
should not be regarded as a confidential com-
munication which the privilege seeks to protect.
Thus in Howard v. State,"9 a wife's observation
that her husband returned home late at night
with strains on his shirt resembling blood was
not privileged, apparently because it could be
easily observed by others. Yet, in State v.
Robbins, 2 the Court held as privileged a wife's
testimony that her husband sat in a stolen
automobile parked in front of the local City-
County Building in full view of the public.
These seemingly contrary results may be
reconciled by the fact that in the Howard case,
third persons observing the defendant could
reasonably suspect, from his appearance (i.e.,
his bloody shirt) that he had been involved in
some trouble. In the Robbins case, however, the
observing public would not reasonably surmise
from the accused's act of sitting in a parked car
that he had stolen it and that his wife was at
that moment obtaining license plates therefor.2a
19 103 Tex. Crim. 205, 280 S.W. 586 (1926),
applying Txx. CODE CGlu. Ppoc. Art. 714: "Neither
husband nor wife shall... testify as to communica-
tions made by one to the other while married; nor
shall they, after the marriage relation ceases, be
made witnesses as to any such communication...
they shall in no case testify against each other ex-
cept in a criminal prosecution for an offense com-
mitted by one against the other."
20 35 Wash. 2d 389, 213 P.2d 310 (1950) applying
WAsm REv. STAT. § 1214, P. 1: "A husband cannot
be examined for or against his wife without her
consent; nor a wife for or against her husband, with-
out his consent; nor can either, during the marriage
or afterward, be, without the consent of the other,
examined as to any communication made by one
to the other during the marriage."
21 The Court stated, "It might at first be supposed
that appellant's act of waiting in an automobile in
sight of all on a public thoroughfare, was not an
act done in reliance upon the confidence established
by the marital relation. He was apparently willing
to be seen by the public, including acquaintances
[Vol. 47
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This interpretation is, in effect, a refinement of
the original limitation upon the Daghita theory:
that even though the act is done within the
public's view, it will nevertheless be privileged
if the wife alone knows the implications of the
act in question and if it was primarily done in
reliance upon the marital confidence.
A further seeming inconsistency between
these two cases is furnished by the Court's
ruling in the Robbins case that the accused's
wife could testify that she applied at the City-
County Building for license plates for the stolen
vehicle in her husband's name, she signing as
agent. This was correctly admitted for it was an
act done by her alone, the trier of fact being
free to infer that she acted persuant to her
husband's instruction (the substance of which
instruction would be privileged). The Howard
case, on the other hand, held as privileged the
wife's testimony that she afterward burned her
husband's blood-stained shirt, presumably at
his behestY While this would seem to violate
the rule which admits acts done in reliance upon
a privileged communication, a possible explana-
tion of this result may lie in the degree of
prejudice contained in the evidence of the
Howard case. Although the testimony was
highly relevant in both cases, courts have not
hesitated to exclude relevant evidence where its
who might be passing by. The reason that he was
not afraid of being seen by the general public, how-
ever, was that it was unlikely that this would result
in connecting appellant with the transaction then
taking place inside the building. But his wife knew
why he was waiting there, and was accordingly in a
position to disclose appellant's connection'with the
transaction then in progress. It is obvious that he
would not have waited in the automobile had he not
relied upon the confidence between them by reason of
the marital relation." (Italics supplied). 35 Wash.
2d at 393, 213 P.2d. at 314.
'a Sampson v. Sampson, 233 Mass. 451, 112 N.E.
84 (1916). See note 2 supra.
m The Court stated, "If she burned (the shirt)
without the knowledge or connivance of appellant,
he would not be bound thereby; and if she burned it
at his request, or as a result of a private conversa-
tion ... " it would be privileged. 280 S.W. 586, 588
(Tex. Crim.). The holding obviously assumes the
latter alternative, since the act is privileged.
prejudicial effects would outweigh its probative
value.24
Thus in cases where a communicative intent
is not apparent, courts have inferred the intent
from the circumstances surrounding the act
itself. The better reasoned opinions, however,
apply the privilege upon the broad theory that
the act would not have been done except upon
an assumption by the actor that the communi-
cation would be held inviolate because of the
marital confidence then existing between the
spouses. Thus the emphasis is not upon whether
the actor intended to convey an idea to his
spouse, but rather on whether he would have
done the act at all if he did not believe that it
would remain confidential between the spouses.
As a limiation upon the broad theory, acts
observable by third persons have not been
privileged except where the implications of the
act would not be readily apparent to outside
observers. Lastly, the admission or exclusion of
testimony by a spouse will be subjected to the
orthodox tests of relevancy and prejudice.
Cases where an Intent Not to Communicate
Is Present
In the third type of case, courts have uni-
formly refused to extend the privilege to protect
the acts in question. Such refusal rests upon
two theories: (1) that from the very nature of
the act a strong presumption arises that the
actor does not desire to call his spouse's at-
tention to his act, and hence makes no assertion
which will be preceived; and (2) that the act is
not done in reliance upon the marital confidence,
and that the marital harmony, which it is the
purpose of the privilege to protect is more likely
to be-upset than furthered. While both of these
theories may come into play in the same case,
2 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, Rule 303 (1942):
"(1) The judge may in his discretion exclude evi-
dence if he finds that its probative value is out-
weighed by the risk that its admission will ...
create substantial danger of undue prejudice...'.
See also Stewart v. People, 23 Mich. 63, 75 (1871),
"The proper test for the admissibility of evidence
ought to be... whether it has a tendency to affect
belief in the mind of a reasonably cautious person,
who should receive and weigh it with judicial fair-
ness."
19561
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the first theory is particularly illustrated in a
case where the accused's wife observed him in
the act of burying an object in their yard,
erecting a structure thereon to make the point
of burial inaccessible. The object buried was the
body of the accused's mother-in-law whom he
had murdered.25 The operation of both theories,
but particularly the second, operated to prevent
the privilege from applying where the accused's
wife observed him in the act of sexual inter-
course with his step-daughter,2 and where a
wife saw her husband sprinkle a substance on
her food which was subsequently shown to be
poison.
27
Cases Involving Acts of Abuse
Since the policy of the privilege seeks the
preservation of the relationship involved, the
reason for applying the privilege ceases to exist
where the act sought to be protected from dis-
closure is destructive of the marital harmony by
being injurious to one of the spouses orincontra-
vention of law. By inquiry as to whether the
application of the privilege will preserve the
relation, or, on the other hand, further the harm
already done to it, the courts have recognized
as an exception to the privilege acts of abuse
committed by one spouse against the welfare
of the other. To a large extent, this exception
overlaps the prior class of cases. The exception is
recognized in both civil actions 28 and in criminal
prosecutions.
2 9
25 Smith v. State, 198 Ind. 156, 152 N.E. 803
(1926).
26 State v. Snyder, 84 Wash. 485, 147 Pac. 38
(1915) applying the Washington statute, note 20
supra.
2 Commonwealth v. Sapp, 90 Ky. 580, 14 S.W.
834 (1890).
218 There is a conflict of authority as to this ex-
ception in civil actions. Reynolds v. Reynolds, 297
Mo. 447, 249 S.W. 407 (1923) applying a statute
which privileged "admissions or conversations"
(but which has since been amended to extend to
"admission or confidential communications", note
9 supra) allowed such testimony in a divorce pro-
ceeding on the general grounds that the granting of
a divorce would be unduly complicated if such
evidence could not be introduced into the record.
Another, more formal ground for not applying the
Thus where a husband carried a revolver on
his person and made continued threats against
his wife, the act was not privileged." Likewise,
the privilege did not apply where the accused
had seized his wife bodily, abusing her, and
forced her to forge a document.3' While the
weight of authority indicates that this exception
applies only in a criminal prosecution for an
offense committed by one spouse against the
other or in a civil action where the spouses are
privilege in divorce cases is that since the grounds
for divorce may involve acts of abuse by one spouse
against the other, the recognized exception for acts
of abuse comes into play.
However, the Illinoi courts have excluded testi-
mony by a spouse concerning acts of abuse by the
other spouse. See Griffeth v. Griffeth, 162 Ill. 368,
44 N.E. 820 (189)--divorce action where the de-
fendant's previously divorced wife could not testify
as to his acts of abuse toward her; and Fox v. Fuchs,
241 Ill. App. 242 (1926)--alienation of affections
suit. The Illinois statute, note 29 infra has been
interpreted so as to exclude testimony of any
"fact or transaction" of the marriage. See People v.
Rogers, 348 Ill. 322, 180 N.E. 856 (1932) (perjury
action), In re Ford's Estate, 70 Utah 456, 261 Pac.
15 (1927); Whitehead v. Kirk, 104 Miss. 776, 61
So. 737 (1913).
29 While this exception was applied at common
law, it has been embodied in most modern statutes.
E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. c. 51, § 5 (1953): "Nothing in
this section shall be construed to authorize or per-
mit any such husband or wife to testify to any
admissions or conversations of the other, whether
made by him to her or her to him. . . except in
suits or causes between such husband and wife."
However, the Illinois Supreme Court held in Miner
v. People, 58 Ill. 59 (1871) that the above section
did not modify the common law rule, and only
applies in civil cases. Criminal prosecutions are
governed by ILL. R1Ev. STAT. c. 38 § 736 (1953):
".... all trials for criminal offenses shall be con-
ducted according to the course of the common
law ... and the rules of evidence of the common
law shall also be binding upon all courts and juries
in criminal cases ... ".
30 Hafer v. Lemon, 182 Okla. 578, 79 P.2d 216
(1938). See also Hall v. Commonwealth, 309 Ky.
74,215 S.W.2d 840 (1948).
31 Beyerline v. State, 147 Ind. 125, 45 N.E. 772
(1897).
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